Missouri Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 3 Summer 1982

Article 3

Summer 1982

Assuring Long-Term Employment in a Missouri Close Corporation:
The Need for Legislative Reform
James G. Blasé

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James G. Blasé, Assuring Long-Term Employment in a Missouri Close Corporation: The Need for
Legislative Reform, 47 MO. L. REV. (1982)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Blasé: Blase: Assuring Long-Term Employment in a Missouri Close Corporation:

ASSURING LONG-TERM
EMPLOYMENT IN A MISSOURI
CLOSE CORPORATION: THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
JAMES G. BLASE* T
Introduction .........................................
CurrentApproaches ...................................
A. The Long-Term Employment Contract .................
B. ShareholderAgreements ............................
C.
The IrrevocableProxy .............................
D . The Voting Trust ................................
E. Class Voting ....................................
F. High Vote and Quorum Requirements ..................
Statutory Alternatives ..................................
A. The Unified Approach .............................
B.
The IntegratedApproach ...........................
Conclusion ..........................................

I.
II.

III.

IV .

I.

471
474
475
481
484
485
486
486
488
489
491
494

INTRODUCTION

The American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law's recent
publication of the Proposed Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the
Model Business Corporation Act1 has resulted in a renewed awareness among
members of the legal community of the special need for statutory provisions
to accommodate closely held corporations. This need is especially acute in
Missouri, where Professor O'Neal has chastised the state's judiciary for its
refusal to protect the reasonable expectations of persons who acquire an interest in a close corporation, including their expectations to participate in
2
management or to be employed by the company.
*

Associate with Thompson & Mitchell, St. Louis, Missouri. B.S.B.A., 1978,
John Carroll University; J.D., 1981, University of Notre Dame Law School;
LL.M., 1982, New York University Graduate School of Law.
t The author expresses his gratitude to Professor George D. Hornstein of
the New York University Graduate School of Law, who supplied valuable assistance
and encouragement in the preparation of this Article.
1. ProposedStatutory Close CorporationSupplement to the Model Business Corporation Act, 37 BUS. LAW. 269 (1981).

2.

1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.15, n. ll

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

1

472

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Shareholders in a closely held corporation can normally expect to devote
their full time to the management of the company. If the shareholderemployee's position in the new company can be terminated at any time by
the board of directors, 3 he may be unwilling to give up his present employment and risk investing his savings in the new enterprise. In addition, many
close corporations distribute much of their profits as compensation rather
than as dividends, primarily for income tax reasons. 4 Thus, a minority
shareholder, unless he can convince the majority to insert a mandatory dividend provision in the articles of incorporation, 5 must somehow assure himself
permanent employment by the corporation and protect himself against arbitrary reductions
in his salary, if he expects to gain a fair return on his
6
investment.

The power to assure its potential investors and key employees perma-.
nent or long-term employment in a managerial position is thus essential to
the operation of a closely held corporation. "To withhold this power," according to Professor O'Neal, "will often make it difficult for a new corporation, especially a close corporation, to get the services of an executive or other
skilled employee." 7 Yet, despite this inherent need, the Missouri courts have
consistently invalidated long-term employment arrangements for corporate
officers on one or more of the following grounds: (1) the agreement violates
Missouri's statute requiring the directors to manage the affairs of the
corporation, 8 (2) it violates the statute requiring the directors to select the
corporate officers, 9 or (3) it is at variance with the spirit of the statute authoriz(2d ed. 1971). See also O'Neal, Close Corporations:ExistingLegislation andRecommended

Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 885 (1978). Missouri's need for specificlegislation dealing'
with the unique problems of close corporations was first articulated almost a decade
ago in Comment, Missouri CorporationStatutes-NeededChangesforClose Corporations,
38 MO. L. REV. 460 (1973), in which the author proposed that the rigid shareholder-

director-officer structure be modified in close corporations to allow for contractual
arrangements fitting specific needs.
3. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.365 (1978).
4. I.R.C. § 162 (1976) includes among the "ordinary and necessary" expenses deductible by a business a "reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for services actually rendered." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (1958) provides
that the test for deductibility of compensation payments is "whether they are
reasonable and are in fact payments purely for services."
5. See Kessler, Employment Arrangements in Close Corporations, 11 SETON HALL
L. REV. 187, 188 (1980).
6. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 6.02.
7. Id. § 6.06.
8. Mo. REV. STAT. §351.310 (1978). See, e.g., Streett v. Laclede-Christy Co.,
409 S.W.2d 691, 694-95 (Mo. 1966); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351,
359 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Gonseth v. K &K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d 18, 26 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1969).
9. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.360 (Cum.Supp. 1981). See, e.g., Streett v.
Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691, 694-95 (Mo. 1966); Gonseth v. K & K Oil
Co., 439 S.W.2d 18, 26 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/3
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ing removal of corporate officers and.agents at the pleasure of the board.10
Furthermore, because of the public policy against forcing unwilling parties
into consensual relationships, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that
it will not grant specific performance of a contract for personal services."1

Thus, the Missouri judiciary has indicated that it will declare void any agreement that deprives the directors of their statutory powers or tends to influence
their judgment in corpbrate decisions. The Missouri courts are especially
inclined to invalidate an agreement if it fixes the salary of a designated officer at a rather substantial amount and provides for permanent or longterm employment. 12
Nevertheless, numerous decisions outside Missouri, including many recent decisions, 13 have held that unanimous shareholder agreements allocating
positions and salaries among the shareholders are effective, despite curtailing of the future discretion of the directors. 14 The rationale of these decisions appears to be that espoused by Professor Hornstein nearly a quartercentury ago:
[T]he shareholders being the real parties in interest and the complete owners of the corporation, it is difficult to find any basis for
denying them the control which would be possessed by a noncorporate owner when they act as one by unanimously agreeing upon
specific corporate action-unless some vital public interest be affected. The directors themselves haste no personal interest (except
their prestige) 15
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.365(1978). See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351, 359 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
11. See, e.g., Beets v. Tyler; 290 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. 1956); Richardson v.
Ozark Airlines, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Mo. 1954).
12. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 359 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
13. For example, in Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 84 Ill.
App. 3d 713, 406
N.E.2d 131 (1980), the court upheld a unanimous oral shareholder agreement that
provided for the election of the parties thereto as directors and officers of the closely held corporation and for an equal distribution of salaries and profits, as long as
the parties remained shareholders or the corporation remained in existence.
14. The most celebrated decisions include Galler v. Galler, 32111. 2d 16, 203
N.E.2d 577 (1964), and Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). See
notes 60-66 and accompanying text infra. For an explanation of these and other cases
involving unanimous shareholder agreements restricting the discretion of the board
of directors, see 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, §§ 1.15, 5.04, 5.17.
15. G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATIONLAWANDPRACTICE § 178 (1959). See
also Hornstein, Stockholders'Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J.
1040 (1950). Nearly a quarter-century before Professor Hornstein first articulated
his view in the now-classic Yale LawJournal article, an Illinois court had noted that
the mere fact that the property, which all the parties owned, came to be
represented by the corporate stock could not interfere with the fact that,
being the sole owners of all the property, they were in a position to enter
into any contract they saw fit, concerning the use of the property and its

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Professor O'Neal concurs in the position that a unanimous vote of the
shareholders should control or overrule directors:
Unanimous shareholders' agreements which deprive the directors
of some of their management powers are most often attacked on the
grounds that they are against public policy and that they violate certain statutory norms, particularly the one conferring corporate
management on the board of directors. If an agreement does not
adversely affect creditors or other noncontracting persons, the public
policy objection is (aside from statute) without any basis
whatsoever. 16
In order to respond to the objection that even a unanimous shareholder
agreement should be ineffective if it violates mandatory norms in the corporation statute,'" the Missouri legislature must enact special statutory provisions designed to accommodate close corporations. These specially formulated provisions presently exist in at least half of the states."' With this
thesis, the objective of this Article is twofold: first, to demonstrate the futility
of the various devices currently available in Missouri for assuring a minority
shareholder long-term employment in a closely held corporation, and second, to propose statutory alternatives, the provisions of which may be incorporated into the existing Missouri statutes, to help protect the reasonable
expectations of persons who acquire an interest in a Missouri close
corporation.
II.

CURRENT APPROACHES

Several approaches have been suggested to the problem of assuring longterm employment and status to a shareholder-employee in a Missouri close
corporation. Among these are the following: (1) use of a long-term employment contract between the shareholder-employee and the corporation, (2)
management, so long as they did not violate any law or interfere with public
policy or the public good.
Fitzgerald v. Christy, 242 Ill. -App. 343, 353 (1926).
16. 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, § 5.24. "[P]olicy considerations favor the enforcement of unanimous shareholders' agreements. First, such agreements meet
a widespread business need. Second, it is sound policy to recognize in shareholders
the same freedom to contract concerning their own affairs that the law favors for
other competent persons." Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. Professor O'Neal maintains that this objection is technical. See 1 F.
O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 5.24.
18. For a current, comprehensive list of these jurisdictions and the applicable
sections of their statutes, see W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 159-63 (2d ed. 1981). For an excellent summary
of the legislation applicable to close corporations, see O'Neal, supranote 2. See also
1 F. O'NEAL, supranote2, §§ 1.14-.14b(1971 &Cum. Supp. 1981). TheProposed
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act
is an example of one such type of statute. See text accompanying notes 127-39 infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/3
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an agreement among all or some of the shareholders assuring the minority
shareholder permanent or long-term employment, (3) granting an irrevocable proxy to the shareholder-employee to vote enough shares to protect his employment, (4) creation of a voting trust whereby shareholders
transfer their shares to a trustee who, under the terms of the trust instrument, will vote the shares to elect specified persons as directors, who can
be expected to maintain the desired persons in office, (5) issuance of a separate
class of stock to the shareholder-employee, which class has the right to elect
a specified number of directors, and (6) utilization of high vote and quorum
requirements for the selection and removal of directors and officers and
changes in their compensation or duties. As the following discussion will
demonstrate, these devices, whether used singly or in combination, are
grossly inefficient in assuring the minority shareholder-employee long-term
employment and status.
A.

The Long-Term Employment Contract

The long-term employment contract approach in Missouri is fraught
with so many objections and uncertainties that it can hardly be considered
a viable alternative for accomplishing long-term employment security. The
first problem is that, in Missouri, the board of directors may not bind future
boards to long-term employment of officers, at least of the corporation's president and secretary. 19 This was first suggested by the Missouri Supreme Court
in Streett v. Laclede-Christy Co. ,20 and has been reaffirmed in several subsequent courts of appeals decisions. 2 1The rationale underlying these decisions
19. Mo. REV. STAT. §351.360 (Cum. Supp. 1981)provides, "Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have a president and a secretary, who shall
be chosen by the directors, and such other officers and agents as shall be prescribed
by the bylaws of the corporation." It could be argued that, under the statute, only
the president and secretary must be elected by the board of directors, while any
other officers or employees may be appointed by the president. Presumably, the
president could enter into a contract to install the minority shareholder as an officer, other than secretary, or as an employee for life, unless the bylaws provided
that such power could be exercised only by the board of directors. There are,
however, serious objections to such contracts. See notes 21-37 and accompanying
text infra.
20. 409 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1966).
21. See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 359 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1976); Gonseth v. K & K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d 18, 26 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969).
Many courts outside Missouri, however, have sustained lifetime employment
contracts, apparently recognizing that they are sometimes necessary for the corporation to obtain the type of executive and other key personnel it needs. See, e.g.,
Wasserman v. Rosengarden, 84 Ill. App. 3d 713, 406 N.E.2d 131 (1980) (dictum);
Plasti-Drum Corp. v. Ferrell, 70 Ill. App. 3d 441, 388 N.E.2d 438 (1979). Professor O'Neal approves of these cases:
A corporation should have power to enter into contracts for lifetime
or other long-term employment. To withhold this power will often make
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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seems to be that long-term employment contracts for corporate officers run
afoul of the general maxim that management and control of the corporation is statutorily vested in the board of directors, 22 as is the right to elect
officers. 23 It has also been suggested that such contracts are at variance with
the Missouri statute authorizing removal of corporate officers at the pleasure
of the board. 24 Apparently, these same reasons account for the Missouri
it difficult for a new corporation, especially a close corporation, to get the
services of an executive or other skilled employee who... often wants
assurance of lifetime employment. Further, the arguments that long-term
employment contracts deprive shareholders and directors of their statutory
powers have been too strongly stated. After all, a long-term employment
contract does not place any greater restrictions on future boards than does
a long-term lease or other long-term agreement. Further, the existence of
an employment contract does not mean that the board of directors must
permit the employee to continue to manage or control any part of the affairs of the corporation. The directors can lay down rules to control his
action or they can deprive him of all authority whatsoever to act for the
corporation. They have the power to revoke his authority, although they
may render the corporation liable for breach of contract in so doing. If an
employee disregards reasonable regulations, that justifies his discharge.
1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 6.06.
At least one jurisdiction expressly authorizes corporations to enter into longterm employment contracts. The Texas Business Corporation Act provides that
each corporation shall have the power "to elect or appoint officers and agents of
the corporation for such period of time as the corporation may determine, and define
their duties and fix their compensation." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)
(12) (Vernon 1980).
22. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.310 (1978). See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351, 359 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Gonseth v. K &K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d
18, 26 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.360 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See, e.g., Streett v.
Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1966); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Gonseth v. K & K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d 18
(Mo. App., Spr. 1969).
This objection is easily avoided in states like New York, which permits the
shareholders to elect the officers if the certificate of incorporation so provides. N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW§ 715(b) (McKinney 1963). The commentators agree that such
a provision validates shareholder and certificate provisions guaranteeing continuation of office and set salaries. See R. KESSLER, NEW YORK CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§ 10.05(27) (1968); Kessler, The New York Business CorporationLaw, 36 ST.JOHN'S

L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1961); Zammit, AssuringExecutive Employment to a Shareholderin a
Close Corporation UnderNew York Law, 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 487, 489 (1972).
24. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.365 (1978). See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351, 359 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); 1 F. O'NEAL,.supra note 2, § 6.08.
Although § 351.365 provides that "such removal shall be without prejudice to
the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed," an officer removed under
an invalid long-term contract probably would not have any contract rights. Thus,
he probably could be removed from office without the payment of damages.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/3
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judiciary's consistently narrow construction of agreements providing for
"permanent" employment. 25
Although the Missouri Supreme Court suggested in Streeti that the board
of directors could not validly bind future boards to long-term employment
of officers, the court did hold that the board of directors could bind future
boards to long-term employment of nonofficer employees.-" The court thus
upheld a five-year contract employing a general manager because his additional employment as president had been included in a separate clause of
the contract, to avoid making his employment as general manager dependent on his status as president. 27 Presumably, such contracts are valid because
they do not undercut the statutes conferring management duties and the right
to elect officers on the board of directors. 28 The authorities usually recommend reliance on contracts employing shareholders as nonofficers to achieve
shareholder employment security in states with statutes similar to
Missouri's.

29

25. See, e.g., Minterv. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Co., 187 Mo. App. 16,
173 S.W. 4 (K.C. 1915) (arrangement under which employee was to report to work
with the intention of working permanently held employment at will).
26. 409 S.W.2d at 695.
27. Id. at 694-95.
28. Although not discussed in Streett, it could be argued that if the bylaws of
the corporation vest the directors with the exclusive power to elect the corporation's
general manager, the board could not enter into any contract employing the general
manager for life because to do so would impinge on the discretion of future boards
of directors. This issue has not been resolved.
29. See, e.g., 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote2, §6.10; Kessler, supranote 5, at 214-17.
Professor O'Neal concludes:
The lawyer drafting an employment agreement usually should avoid
describing the employment in terms of one of the elective corporate offices.
In most instances, it will be preferable to hire the employee as general
manager, sales manager, production supervisor, or an executive in some
other nonstatutory position, prescribing his compensation in that capacity;
and then provide that he will serve without additional compensation as a
director if elected by the shareholders, and in any corporate office to which
he is elected by the board of directors.
By avoiding reference to employment in terms of statutory officerships,
the draftsman perhaps somewhat diminishes the risk that an agreement
will be held to contravene a statute conferring management on the directors or a statute, or charter or bylaw clause providing for election of
specified corporate officers annually by the directors.
1 F. O'NEAL, supra, § 6.10. This advice is more exigent in Missouri than in states
like New York, which allows election of an officer for a term longer than a year.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 715(c) (McKinney 1963). One commentator points out
that if the certificate of incorporation permits election of officers by the shareholders,
a shareholder agreement binding the parties to keep named individuals in office
should be enforceable because it does not impermissibly interfere with board powers.
See Kessler, supra, at 215. See also Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Although the courts recognize that a corporation may enter into a longterm employment contract with a nonofficer employee, they are reluctant
to find authority in a corporate officer or other corporate representative to
bind the corporation to such a contract.3 0 Thus, the Missouri judiciary has
held that there is no inherent power in the president of a corporate employer
to enter into a contract to install an individual as overall general manager
of the corporation's business. 3 1 In the absence of express authority from either
a clearly worded bylaw or resolution of the board of directors, the courts
generally have held that corporate officers or agents do not have inherent
32
authority to hire employees for life.
The second problem with the long-term employment contract is that the
Missouri courts will not specifically enforce employment contracts.3 3 Thus,
the discharged minority shareholder would be relegated to an action at law
for breach of contract.3 4 Because the damages the employee will receive consist solely of the discounted value of his salary for the contract's remaining
term, minus what he can be reasonably expected to earn from other employment during the interval, the minority shareholder probably will be in worse
financial condition than if he were not removed by the corporation.3 5 More
-51 (1941); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§620(a), 715(b) (McKinney 1963 &Cum. Supp.
1981-1982).
30. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 6.07. For a discussion of New York cases invalidating employment contracts for lack of authority in the person negotiating and
executing them on behalf of the corporation, see de Capriles, Business Organization,
34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337,350 (1959). As one New York court has pointed out, contracts for life employment are so unusual that they are usually condemned as
unauthorized by the corporation. Heaman v. E.N. Rowell Co., 261 N.Y. 229, 231,
185 N.E. 83, 84 (1933).
31. I.L. Parks v. Midland Ford Tractor Co., 416 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1967).
32. Fletcher v. Agar Mfg. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Mo. 1942). See also
1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 6.07; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 929 (1953). Butcf. Orchard
Container Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (president
who employed himself as president reaped benefits of the employment contract and
thus could not challenge or deny its validity based on his alleged lack of authority
to bind the corporation).
33. Richardson v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1954). But see
Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897) (contract to buy stock in consideration for services as editor and manager held not mere personal contract for
services, but enforceable in equity).
34. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.365 (1978) provides that removal by the board of
directors of officers and agents elected or appointed by the board shall be without
prejudice to any contract rights of the person removed. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §
716(a)-(b) (McKinney 1963) is similar. Generally, an officer must be discharged
by action signifying the intention of the body authorized to elect or appoint him
that he shall no longer hold office. Kiel v. Fred Medart Mfg. Co., 46 S.W.2d 934
(Mo. App., St. L. 1932).
35. See Zammit, supra note 23, at 488.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/3
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important, perhaps, is the lack of protection of the shareholder's vital interest in preserving his role in the management of the business. Damages
may not provide adequate relief to a shareholder-employee who has staked
3 6
his future on a permanent relationship with the corporation.
36. 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, § 6.05. A potential device for avoiding the rule
against specific enforcement of employment contracts was suggested by the New
York Court of Appeals in Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160
N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959). In this case, a long-term employment contract included a clause providing for arbitration of any dispute arising out of the
contract. A dispute subsequently arose between the directors and the employee,
resulting in an arbitrator's award specifically enforcing the contract. The court
upheld the award, concluding that "[t]here is no controlling public policy which
voids an arbitration agreement like this one and the courts are not licensed to announce a new public policy to fit the supposed necessities of the case." Id. at 164,
160 N.E.2d at 80, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
Staklinski rarely has been followed outside New York and has been widely
criticized by the commentators. See, e.g., Comment, JudicialEnforcement ofArbitration Awards RequiringReinstatement ofEmployees, 55 NW. U.L. REV. 615 (1960); Arbitrationand Award-Enforcement-AwardReinstating Corporation'sExecutive is Specifically
Enforceable, 73 HARV. L. REV. 776 (1960). The dissent had the following
reservations:
An arbitrator's award of specific performance of a contract for personal
services directing the issuance of a mandatory injunction against a foreign
employer in behalf of a nonresident employee who has been wrongfully
discharged is without precedent and violates settled principles of equity.
In such a situation, the courts of this State are not bound to uphold an arbitration award that offends established principles of law and public policy.
6 N.Y.2d at 164, 160 N.E.2d at 80, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (Burke, J., dissenting).
When an award has public policy ramifications beyond the limits of the private
dispute, courts generally hold that the award must yield to laws of general applicability. See Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 I11.
2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979); 73 HARV. L. REV., supra, at 778.
Prior to its enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1980, Missouri provided that equity courts retained authority over arbitration awards. MO. REV.
STAT. § 435.240 (1978). A similar Michigan statute was construed to mean that an
equity court could vacate an award if the same decision could not have been reached
by that court. Kearney v. Washtenaw Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 Mich. 246, 85 N.W.
733 (1901). Missouri's new arbitration act, however, states that "the fact that the
relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity
is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 435.405.1(5) (Cum.. Supp. 1981). This significant change in the law may prompt
some to argue that an arbitration award reinstating a corporation's executive should
be specifically enforceable in Missouri. Yet, the identical provision was present in
Board of Trustees, in which the Illinois Supreme Court nevertheless invalidated the
award because it contravened paramount considerations of public policy. See 74 Il.
2d at 420, 386 N.E.2d at 53 (interpreting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 112 (a) (5)
(1975)).

Even if a court could specifically enforce arbitration awards requiring reinstatePublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Another objection to the long-term employment contract as a device for
assuring the shareholder-employee tenure and status is that an employment
contract probably cannot prevent the employee's removal from a particular
corporate office. 37 Neither could the contract protect the shareholderemployee against changes in his duties or locale assignments, lack of cooperathat the majority shareholders may concoct to make
tion, or other annoyances
38
his job unpleasant.
ment of employees, a contract clause providing for arbitration cannot solve other
inherent problems associated with long-term contracts. First, the arbitrator may
award damages rather than specifically enforce the contract. Second, he may find
for the corporate employer. Third, the arbitration process is often time-consuming.
Indeed, a minority shareholder-employee cannot be assured of long-term employment and status unless he possesses the control required to prevent the very attempt
to remove him.
37. See, e.g., Nola v. Merollis Chevrolet Kansas City, Inc., 537 S.W.2d 627
(Mo. App., K.C. 1976). But see Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N.Y. 138, 123 N.E. 139
(1919).
38. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, § 6.04. The contract might contain provisions for severance pay or liquidated damages in the event of breach by the corporation or provisions obligating the corporation to purchase the employee's stock
or give him a lifetime pension if it does not renew the contract at the end of its term.
See B & B Equip. Co. v. Bowen, 581 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979). For a
list of precautions that may strengthen an employment agreement, see 1 F.
O'NEAL, supra, § 6.13.
Both Professors Hornstein and Kessler discuss what an employment contract
should contain. See G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 15, § 519; Kessler, supra note 5, at
191-210. While Professor Hornstein stresses that the employment contract should
be "definite as to duration of employment, duties, and compensation," G. HORNSTEIN, supra, § 519, Professor Kessler includes the following checklist ofprovisions
that should be included in the contract:
1. Term of employment;
2. Employee duties, including time to be devoted (including outside activities to be permitted), and possibly who can prescribe place for
performance;
3. Employee powers, and possibly who can fix, and employee liability for
exercise of powers beyond those permitted;
4. Compensation, including fringe benefits, pension and stock purchase
rights, if any, and continuation of wages to surviving spouse, or on
disability, if agreed upon;
5. Reimbursement of expenses, and other "perks" (perquisites) including,
of course, vacations;
6. Restrictive covenants against competition during and after employment,
including nondisclosure of trade and business secrets;
7. Termination of employment, conditions for, who has power to terminate, and rights on wrongful termination;
8. Provisions for renewal or extension, if any have been agreed upon;
9. Provisions for resolution of disputes, if any have been agreed upon (e.g.,
arbitration);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/3

10

1982]

Blasé: Blase: Assuring Long-Term Employment in a Missouri Close Corporation:

EMPLOYMENT IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
B.

ShareholderAgreements

In lieu of or in addition to a long-term employment contract, the minority
shareholder may seek promises from other shareholders to maintain him in
corporate office at a specified salary for a designated period of years, for as
long as he owns stock in the corporation, or even for life. 39 This device,
although extremely valuable in other jurisdictions, is virtually useless in
Missouri because its courts invalidate shareholder agreements promising
40
corporate office.
The two most celebrated decisions in the shareholder agreement area
are from New York and Illinois. In the first landmark case, Clark v. Dodge,41
an agreement between the corporation's two shareholders provided
[t]hat Dodge during his lifetime and, after his death, a trustee to be
appointed by his will, would so vote his stock and so vote as a director that the plaintiff (a) should continue to be a director of Bell &
Company, Inc. and (b) should continue as its general manager so
long as he should be "faithful, efficient, and competent;" (c) should
during his lifereceive one-fourth of the net income of the corporations either by way of salary or dividends; and (d) that no
unreasonable or incommensurate salaries should be paid to other
officers or agents which would so reduce the net income as materially
42
to affect Clark's profits.
Although provisions (b), (c), and (d) impinged on the shareholders' discretion as directors, the agreement was specifically enforced, apparently on two
grounds. First, there was "no damage suffered by or threatened to
anybody. "13 Second, the invasion of the powers of the board of directors
was "so slight as to be negligible,"'4 4 and there was''no attempt to sterilize
the board." 45 The court stressed, however, that all the shareholders were
46
parties to the agreement.
In Callerv. Caller,47 a minority shareholder sued in equity for an account10. Provisions for enforcement, including possibly specific performance,
liquidated damages, especially concerning noncompetition provisions;
11. "Boilerplate provisions," e.g., agreement binding on parties, legal
representatives and corporate successors in interest; provisions as to
delivery of notices; a provision stipulating that the agreement contains the
entire agreement of parties, and is not orally modifiable; waiver of one
breach not to constitute waiver of other conditions or subsequent breaches;
law applicable; severability.
Kessler, supra, at 192-93.
39. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, §6.14.
40. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
41. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
42. Id. at 414, 199 N.E. at 642.
43. Id. at 417, 199 N.E. at 643.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 413, 199 N.E. at 641.
47. 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
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ing and for specific performance of a shareholder agreement of unlimited
duration that provided for the continued election of certain persons for
specified offices, for a mandatory stated dividend policy, and for salary continuation. -Inholding that the shareholder agreement was enforceable, the
court concluded that when "no injury to a minority interest appears, no fraud
or apparent injury to the public or creditors is present, and no dearly prohibitory statutory language is violated, we can see no valid reason for
precluding the parties from reaching any arrangements concerning the
management of the corporation which are agreeable to all. "48
States such as New York and Illinois thus have recognized the special
need to protect the reasonable expectations of persons who acquire an interest in a close corporation and have enacted statutes expressly permitting
the shareholders to impinge on the board's discretion.4 9 Although the
Missouri Supreme Court in Royster v. Bakers° held that it was not wrongful
"for the stockholders of a corporation, who control or own a majority of the
stock, to agree among themselves to vote their stock a certain way" 5 1 (the
so-called shareholder "pooling agreement' '52), the Springfield Court of Appeals, in Gonseth v. K &K Oil Co. ,53 has since emphasized that an agreement
which assumes to change the shareholders' right to participate in the control of the corporation or which undertakes to divest the board of directors
of management of the corporation's property and business or deprive the
directors of the right to elect officers will not be enforced and cannot sup5
port an action. 4
Ironically, the major advantage of a shareholder pooling agreement,
which is permitted in Missouri, also constitutes its primary deficiency. As
Professor O'Neal succinctly points out, a pooling agreement can be beneficial
in states in which shareholder agreements designating the corporate officers
will not be enforced, by providing "for the election of directors who can be
expected to maintain the desired persons in office."

55

The deficiency is that,

although the directors can be expected to maintain the minority shareholder
in office, they cannot be required to,5 6 and no matter how sincere the parties' intentions are when they first enter into the agreement, a change of heart
is always possible. Thus, once elected, a majority of the board of directors
57
can at any time vote to remove the shareholder-employee from office.
Similarly, the directors need not vote to re-elect the minority shareholder
48. Id. at 30, 203 N.E.2d at 585.
49. See notes 102-06 & 119-25 and accompanying text infra.
50. 365 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1963).
51. Id. at 500.
52. G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 15, § 158.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

439 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969).
Id. at 26.
1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, §6.14.
Gonseth v. K & K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d 18, 26 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.365 (1978).
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when his term in office expires.58 Although the minority shareholder cannot force the other directors to keep him in office, the other directors
presumably can compel the minority shareholder to elect them as directors,
under Royster.
Several other drawbacks to a pooling agreement in Missouri can best
be illustrated by postulating a common scenario. A, B, and C form a corporation, provide for a three-man board of directors, and divide its 100 shares
as follows: 50 to A, 25 to B, and 25 to C. If C wants to assure himself longterm employment through a pooling agreement, A would have to be a party to elect enough favorable-directors to the board to keep C in office, even
with mandatory cumulative voting.5 9 If all three join in the agreement, appointing A, B, and C as directors, and if A or B dies in office, unless otherwise provided in the articles or bylaws of the corporation, 60 the vacancy on
the board must be filled by a majority of the directors then in office. If the
remaining director and C each desire a different person to fill the vacancy,
6
one or both would probably invoke Missouri's provisional director statute. 1
It provides that if a corporation "has an even number of directors who are
equally divided and cannot agree as to the management of its affairs" such
that its business cannot be conducted profitably or such that its property and
business might be impaired or lost, a court may appoint an impartial provisional director. 62 C's future fate as an officer would thus depend on the
provisional director. The situation would be even more drastic if only B and
C entered into the pooling agreement, because they could appoint only one

58. Id. § 351.360 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
59. Id. § 351.245 (3) (1978) provides for cumulative voting. The formula for
determining how many shares must be voted to secure representation on the board
is as follows:
X

ac
+1
b+I
a
= number of shares voting
b
= number of directors to be elected
c
= number of directors desired to be elected
X = number of shares necessary to elect the number of directors desired
to be elected
C would need to elect two favorable directors in order to have control of the threeman board. Under the above formula, C would need 51 shares to elect two directors. Because B's and C's combined shares total only 50, they could elect only one
director between them. Similarly, A alone could elect only one director. A provisional director probably would be appointed by the court to fill the board vacancy,
unless A, B, and C could agree on a third director. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
60. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.320 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

61.

Id. § 351.323 (1978).

62.

Id.
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of them as a director. 63 If they elected B as their representative on the board
and if B died during office, A could appoint his own nominee to fill the
vacancy. 64 Finally, the pre-emptive right of a shareholder to acquire addi65
tional shares may be limited or denied by the articles of incorporation.
Therefore, if the articles deny the shareholders pre-emptive rights, A and
B could vote together to issue enough shares to a nominee that would enable
66
them to oust C as a director.
C.

The Irrevocable Proxy

Instead of entering into a pooling agreement, shareholders may agree
to surrender the power to vote their own shares and transfer that power,
inthe form of an irrevocable proxy, to one or more of the parties to the agreement or to someone not a party to the agreement. A proxy is simply an
authorization given by a shareholder to another to vote his shares. 67 In
Missouri, the use of proxies is permitted by statute:
A shareholder may vote either in person or by proxy executed
in writing by the shareholder or by his duly authorized attorney in
fact. No proxy shall be valid after eleven months from the date of
its execution, unless otherwise provided in the proxy. A duly executed proxy shall be irrevocable if it states that it is irrevocable and
if, and only so long as, it is coupled with an interest sufficient in law
to support an irrevocable power of attorney. The interest with which
it is coupled need not be an interest in the shares themselves. 6
Professor O'Neal points out that an irrevocable proxy "may be advantageous in a voting agreement to facilitate the carrying out of the agreement
and to avoid the possibility that a suit for specific performance, with the attendant uncertainties and delays, will be necessary to implement decisions
reached under the agreement. '69 At the same time, however, he stresses
that a provision for an irrevocable proxy "opens up the agreement to grave
63.

See note 59 supra.

64. Under Mo. REV. STAT. §351.320 (Cum.Supp. 1981), a "sole remaining director" may fill a board vacancy. This example assumes that the board
originally consisted of only two directors, because B and C together with 50 shares
could elect only one director and A with his 50 shares could also elect only one director. If a provisional director had been appointed by the court to fill the original board
vacancy, his approval would have been necessary forA's nominee to fill the vacancy
created by B's death. If the provisional director and A disagreed on who should fill
the vacancy, the court presumably could appoint an additional provisional director.
65. Id. § 351.305 (1978).
66. For example, if the corporation issued 100 shares to A's and B's nominee
D, C would still need 51 voting shares to elect even one director. Even if B voted
his shares with C, their total number of shares would only be 50. See note 59 supra.
67. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, §5.36.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. §351.245.4 (1978). Many otherjurisdictions have similar
statutes. 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, § 5.37.
69. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 5.36.
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risks. "70 One of those dangers results from the Missouri provision that makes
all proxies revocable except those "coupled with an interest," a concept that
Professor O'Neal describes as "narrowly restrictive. "71An irrevocable proxy
thus may not protect a minority shareholder's long-term employment and
status. In addition, because a proxy arrangement is generally considered
72
a special form of agency, the courts usually apply agency rules to proxies.
Courts normally assume that a proxy is revoked automatically by the death
or incapacity of either the maker or holder of the proxy. 73 In the above
hypothetical, if B and C had entered into an agreement conferring on C an
irrevocable proxy to vote B's shares, on B's death, C could not elect even
74
a single director.
The greatest deficiency of the irrevocable proxy is that it can accomplish
no more than a pooling agreement alone. According to Professor O'Neal,
"A shareholders' agreement setting up irrevocable proxies has the same effect
ultimately as a pooling agreement without proxies, assuming the latter will
be specifically enforced; and therefore considerations governing the validity
75
of the two types of contracts should be the same."
D.

The Voting Trust

A voting trust is a device whereby two or more persons owning stock
with voting powers transfer the voting rights to a trustee or trustees in whom
voting rights of all depositors in the trust are pooled for, among other things,
the election of directors. 76 It differs from an irrevocable proxy because it does
not make the stockholder or the trustee the other's agent. 77 It is possible,
however, for a participating shareholder to serve as trustee.7 8 Voting trusts
are expressly authorized by statute in Missouri, with no limit on their
duration. 79

The major drawback to the voting trust approach is the same as in the
pooling agreement and irrevocable proxy approaches: none can fully insure
a minority shareholder long-term employment. Because all a voting trust
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
director

Id.

Id. 9 6.15.
Id. § 5.36.
Id.
Under the formula in note 59 supra, C would need 26 shares to elect one
on a three-man board. B's death or incapacity would leave C with only

25 shares with which to vote for directors. This example assumes that no buy-sell
agreement exists, in either the form of a redemption agreement or a cross-purchase
agreement.
75.
76.
77.
78.

1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, 5 5.36.
Id. § 5.3 1.

Id.
Zammit, supra note 23, at 492.

79. Mo. REV. STAT. §351.246 (1978). Most voting trust statutes limit the duration of a voting trust, usually to ten years. 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, §5.34. See,
e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 5 621(a) (McKinney 1963).
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can guarantee is the election of specified directors, who are expected to keep
the shareholder-employee in office, the device cannot prevent a disgruntled
director from voting to remove the minority shareholder from office or from
not voting to re-elect him. Thus, in Missouri, the ultimate effect of a voting
trust is the same as that of a pooling agreement. 80
E.

Class Voting

Class voting for directors can assure minority shareholders in a close
corporation representation on the board of directors. Under class voting,
the corporation sets up two or more classes of stock, providing that each class
can elect a specified number or a specified percentage of the directors. The
corporation then issues each class of stock to a different shareholder or group
of shareholders.' For example, a minority shareholder could be given a class
of stock enabling him to elect two of the three directors.
Although this approach appears to be the most effective way to assure
a minority shareholder long-term employment with the corporation, 82 it is

not often used in this manner. "[T]he other participants, particularly if they
have put up the lion's share of the capital for the enterprise, will not be willing
to relinquish all control to a single participant, no matter how valuable he
may be to the enterprise.' '83 Furthermore, although the Missouri statutes
appear to permit such arrangements,8 4 classification of shares has been found
unlawful in Missouri as conflicting with the constitutional right to vote
cumulatively. 85 In any event, the likelihood of class voting ever being used
to give a minority shareholder control over the board is small.
F.

High Vote and Quorum Requirements

The final suggested approach for assuring a minority shareholder longterm employment and status is to require in the articles of incorporation or
bylaws unanimity or a high vote of the directors for selecting or removing
86
officers and k~y employees and for changing their compensation or duties,
80. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra.
81. O'Neal, supra note 2, at 881.
82. Because the minority shareholder would control the board of directors,
he could re-elect himself as an officer at each election of officers. This example
assumes that the minority shareholder elected friendly directors who would not later
become hostile, as a fellow shareholder might become.
83. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 6.04.
84. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.180.1, .315.2 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
85. Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. 238 (Aug. 24, 1964). The opinion gives no authority
for this position beyond Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 6, and efforts to obtain clarification of its legal basis from the Attorney General have thus far been unsuccessful.
See W. PAINTER, supra note 18, at 172 n.247. It is perhaps significant that the provision in the Missouri statute allowing class voting was added in 1965, one year
after the Attorney General's Opinion was released. See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.315.2

(1978).
86.

See 1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, § 6.16.
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or a high or unanimous quorum for board meetings the purpose of which
is to consider removal. In the latter case, the minority shareholder's absence
87
from the meeting would defeat any attempt to remove him from office.
The use of either or both alternatives is expressly sanctioned under the
Missouri statute. 88 For either of these devices to be successful, the minority
shareholder must be represented on the board of directors. This can be accomplished by one or more of the devices previously discussed, i.e., a pooling agreement, cumulative voting, a voting trust, or class voting.
Article of incorporation or bylaw provisions requiring unanimity or a
high vote of the directors for the selection or removal of officers and key
employees carry a number of limitations and disadvantages that Professor
O'Neal has summarized in his treatise:
In the first place, they give a veto and no more; they do not enable
minority shareholders to affirmatively determine corporate policy
and go forward with the execution of that policy. Secondly, they
deprive the corporation of flexibility which it may need in order to
adjust to unexpected business situations. At the time an enterprise
is being incorporated, the draftsman cannot foresee changes in policy
and methods of operation which may in the future become disadvantageous. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, even if all the
shareholders in a particular corporation can be expected to act in
good faith, the presence of veto arrangements increases the chance
that a deadlock will occur in the corporation's management which
will paralyze the corporation and render it unable to conduct its affairs. Finally, veto provisions may place an unscrupulous shareholder
in a position to extort (as a condition of approval of beneficial cor89
porate action) unfair concessions from the other shareholders.
Several problems are also associated with requiring a high or unanimous
quorum for board meetings the purpose of which is to consider removal of
officers or employees. One practical problem is that, unless the quorum requirement is buttressed with a rather strict rule requiring notice of the
business to be conducted at each meeting, the minority shareholder must
avoid every shareholders' or board meeting in order to prevent being caught
unaware by an unexpected motion to discharge him.90 This may not be possible in Missouri because the statute provides that" [n]either the business to
be transacted at, nor the purpose of, any regular meeting of the board of
directors need be specified in the notice or waiver of notice of the meeting.'"91
Furthermore, although the Missouri judiciary has not ruled on the issue,
some state courts have held that the directors have a duty to attend board
meetings and may not stay away in order to prevent action to which they

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Zammit, supra note 23, at 491.
Mo. REV. STAT. §5 351.265, .270, .325 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
1 F. O'NEAL, supranote 2, § 4.30.
Id. §4.22.
Mo. REV. STAT. 5351.340.1 (1978).
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object. 92 Thus, in Gearingv. Kelley, 93 a New York Court of Appeals decision,
a director deliberately refrained from attending a board of directors meeting
to prevent the other two directors from filling a board vacancy with their
own nominee. The court held that the absent director, as well as a shareholder
who approved of and aided his actions, who together owned fifty percent
of the corporation's stock, were estopped from asserting that the filling of
the vacancy by the board was invalid because a quorum of directors was not
present.94
Whether the New York view would prevail in Missouri is uncertain.
Although the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Hall v. Hall9 5 held that a fifty percent shareholder had no duty to and could not be compelled to attend
a shareholders' meeting, the court may have implied that a director has a
fiduciary duty to attend directors' meetings:
The holder of shares is under no obligation whatever to the corporation other than to make full payment of the consideration for which
the shares are issued. .

.

. As participation by a shareholder in

management of corporate affairs is voluntary, it necessarily follows
that no shareholder may be compelled to attend or participate in
shareholders' meetings. Any different rule would contradict the distinction which separatesthe corporateexistencefrom the identity of its shareholders
and which vests management responsibilities in the directors.96
III.

STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES

The failure of each of the above approaches to assuring a minority
shareholder long-term employment stems from the view of the Missouri
courts that shareholder agreements which violate the statutory norms conferring corporate management and the right to elect and remove corporate
officers on the board of directors are against public policy. Such agreements,
however, would not be against the public policy of the state if the Missouri
legislature enacted statutes that expressly permit the shareholders of a closely
held corporation to unanimously agree to confer some or all of the corporate
management on the shareholders. Professor Hornstein summarizes the
public policy argument as follows:
At what point does a shareholders' agreement violate "public policy"
and become void? Concededly "public policy" is an uncertain guide.
• . . Yet, public policy must be ascertained and at two levels:
legislative and judicial. The former, if it can be ascertained, prevails.
Judicial views as to public policy, no matter how firmly established,
must give way when the legislature enacts a contrary rule. Under

92.

1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 4.22.

93.

11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962).

94.
95.
96.

Id. at 204, 182 N.E.2d at 392, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
506 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974).
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
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our legal
system the legislature is the ultimate spokesman on public
97
policy.
It is thus imperative that Missouri join the growing trend among the
itates and enact legislation designed to recognize the special needs of closely
held corporations. The close corporation legislation passed in other jurisdictions follows two patterns: (1) close corporation provisions-spread throughout
the corporation statute, commonly called "unified" statutes, or (2) a separate
chapter of the corporation statute, commonly called "integrated" close corporation statutes.9 Without adopting such relatively progressive legislation,
Missouri has in the past provided that a corporation need have only one director if so stated in the articles of incorporation,99 permitted informal action
by shareholders and directors in lieu of a meeting, in effect allowing oneman corporations, 100 and authorized the courts to appoint provisional directors to break deadlocks. 10 1 The time is now for the Missouri legislature to
take the next step on the path of corporate law reform by enacting special
provisions that will protect the reasonable expectations of persons who acquire an interest in a close corporation.
A.

The Unified Approach

The unified approach is best exemplified by the New York Business Corporation Law. This statute contains numerous provisions designed to meet
the needs of close corporations. The primary section permits, under certain
specified conditions, a provision in the certificate of incorporation
otherwise prohibited by law because it improperly restricts the board
in its management of the business of the corporation, or improperly
transfers to one or more shareholders or to one or more persons or
corporations to be selected by him or them, all or any part of such
management
otherwise within the authority of the board under this
10 2
chapter.
In addition, the provision will be valid "only so long as no shares of the corporation are listed on a national securitie5 exchange or regularly quoted in
an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national or
affiliated securities association." 10 3 The provision may be removed only on
the "vote of the holders of two-thirds of all outstanding shares entitled to
vote thereon or by the holders of such greater proportion of shares as may
be required by the certificate of incorporation for that purpose.'104
97.

G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 15, § 157.

98. W. PAINTER, supra note 18, at 159-63. See also O'Neal, supra note 2, at
873-81.
99.

Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.315 (1978).

100.
101.

Id. §§ 351.273, .340.
Id. § 351.323. See notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.

102.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1963 & Cum. Supp.

1981-1982).
103. Id. 5 620(c) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
104. Id. 620(d) (McKinney 1963).
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Under the New York statute, the shareholders of a New York close corporation could thus provide in the articles of incorporation for the election
of officers by the shareholders because such action is "otherwise within the
authority of the board," if all the shareholders of the corporation agreed to
include the provision.105 The agreement to elect the named persons as officers for the entire term of the agreement would not be invalid as against
public policy because it would only bind the participants in their shareholder
capacities.1 0 6 Furthermore, the articles of incorporation could require
shareholder unanimity for officer election and removal. Such a clause would
give the minority shareholder-employee the control necessary to veto any
attempt to remove him. He would then not have to be concerned about the
105. Id. § 620(b) (McKinney 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
106. R. KESSLER, supranote 23, § 8.05. Professor Kesslerhas drafted the following example of a provision in the articles of incorporation that would best assure
a minority shareholder long-term employment and status under § 620(b):

Officers
(1) (a) The corporation shall have the following four [or three, or two]
officers: president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary.
(b) A suitable provision providing for the election and removal of
such officers only by the shareholders, and not by the directors, will be inserted in the certificate of incorporation. A provision requiring consent of
all the shareholders for the election and removal of all such officers shall
also be included in the certificate of incorporation.
(2) The parties shall so vote their shares that the following named persons shall be elected to the offices following their names, and shall remain
as such, during the entire term of the agreement, except as otherwise in
this agreement provided, at the annual salaries respectively set forth:

(name)

(office)

(annual salary)

Said salaries shall be in addition to any salaries paid to said officers as
employees.
There shall be no change in any of the aforesaid salaries, nor in any of
the duties of said officers, during the term of the agreement.
(3) Except as otherwise in this agreement provided, or required by law,
no officer shall be removed, with or without cause, for any reason whatsoever, during the term of this agreement.
R. KESSLER, supra, § 8.07.
Perhaps Professor Kessler was too zealous in his protection of the minority
shareholder's interests by including the phrase "with or without cause" in
paragraph (3) of the above provision. As Professor Kessler himself recognized in
a later work, "[ajirtight protection may mean that his co-participants are saddled
with an indolent or even disloyal participant of whom they cannot rid themselves."
Kessler, supra note 5, at 212. He may have had in mind N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 716(c) (McKinney 1963), which allows the attorney general or the holders of 10 %
of the outstanding shares to sue for removal.
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public policy against specific enforcement of employment contracts because
he could never be removed from office in the first place.
B.

The IntegratedApproach

The integrated close corporation statute is the subject of the American
Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law's Proposed Statutory Close
Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act (the
"Supplement").107 The Model Business Corporation Act originally
contained several liberal provisions for close corporations.10 8 As the introductory comment to the Supplement points out, 0 9 its intent is to build on this
close corporation legislation by providing a model statute "for those states
that wish to enact special provisions that incorporate the best available ideas
on the special needs of close corporation shareholders." 110
The Supplement assumes that the state's existing legislation contains
provisions authorizing supermajority voting requirements, shareholder
voting agreements, voting trusts, stock transfer restrictions, class voting for
the election of directors and for the approval of fundamental structural
changes, and dissenters' rights similar to sections 80 and 81 of the Model
Business Corporation Act."I Except for a provision authorizing shareholder
voting agreements, the Missouri statutes contain sections permitting each
of these shareholder activities. " 2 Furthermore, the absence of a provision
expressly authorizing shareholder voting agreements would not be fatal to
the enactment of the Supplement in Missouri because the Missouri Supreme
Court has specifically upheld such agreements." 3 Thus, the Supplement
could be easily incorporated into the existing Missouri statutes.
Section 11 of the Supplement, "Agreements Among Shareholders," is
designed to give "legal sanction to the special needs of the shareholders of
...[close] corporations." 1 4 It provides:
(a) The shareholders of a statutory close corporation may by
unanimous action enter into one or more written agreements to
regulate the exercise of the corporate powers and the management
of the business and affairs of the corporation or the relations among
the shareholders of the corporation.
107.

37 BUS. LAW., supranote 1.

108. These provisions are ummarized in MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION
ACT ANNOTATED § 35, 2, comment (2d ed. 1969).
109. 37 Bus. LAW., supra note 1, at 270-76.
110. Id. at 271.
111. Id. at 270.

112. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.180, .246, .265, .270, .325, .405, .455 (1978 &
Gum. Supp. 1981).
113. Royster v. Baker, 365 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1963). Many states specifically
validate by statute shareholder pooling agreements. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW

§ 620(a) (McKinney 1963). See also W. PAINTER, supranote 18, at 149-51.
114.

37 Bus. LAw., supra note 1, at 291.
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(b) Any agreement authorized by this section shall be valid and
enforceable according to its terms notwithstanding the elimination
of a board of directors, any restriction on the discretion or powers
of the board of directors, or any proxy or weighted voting rights given
to directors and notwithstanding that the effect of the agreement is
to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or that the arrangement of the relations among the shareholders or between the
shareholders and the corporation would otherwise be appropriate
only among partners.
(d) An election not to have a board of directors in an agreement
authorized by this section shall not be valid unless the articles of incorporation contain a statement to that effect ....
(f) A shareholder agreement authorized by this section shall not
be amended except by the unanimous written consent of the
shareholders unless otherwise provided in the agreement.
(h) This section shall not prohibit any other agreement among
two or more shareholders not otherwise prohibited by law.1 15
The official comment to section 11 states that it would authorize the
shareholders of a statutory close corporation to enter into any agreement
regulating the business of the corporation and their relationship to one
another, including provisions specifying the directors and officers of the corporation and the terms and conditions of the employment of any officer or
employee by the corporation, regardless of the length of the period of
employment.'16 The only prerequisites are that all of the shareholders of the
corporation must be parties to the agreement and that if the agreement provides that the corporation shall have no board of directors, the articles of
incorporation must contain appropriate language to that effect. 117 Section
11 is essentially derived from similar provisions in the Maryland and Texas
close corporation statutes.11 8
Like the Supplement, the recently enacted Illinois Close Corporation
Act' 1 9 contains a number of specific provisions designed to allow the
shareholders to manage a close corporation. For example, the Illinois statute
provides that all of the shareholders of a close corporation may enter into
a written agreement concerning any phase of the affairs of the corporation,
including the management of the corporation, the officers and directors of
115.
116.

Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 291.

117. Id.
118. Id. at 292. See MD. CORPS. &Ass'NS CODE ANN. §5 4-101 to -603 (1975);
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 12.01-.54 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982).

119.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 1201-1216 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.

1981-1982).
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the corporation, and employment of shareholders by the corporation. 120 Furthermore, if the business of the close corporation is managed by a board of
directors, the Illinois statute provides that an agreement among all of the
shareholders is not invalid because it relates to the conduct of the affairs of
the corporation in a manner that interferes with the discretion of the board
of directors. 121 The statute also provides that no written agreement among
the shareholders of a close corporation, whether embodied in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws of the corporation or in any separate agreement and
which relates to any phase of the affairs of the corporation, including the
management of its business or the division of its profits, shall be invalid as
22
an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation like a partnership.1
Whether this latter provision applies to agreements among any two, a majority, or all of the shareholders is unclear. 23 Another section of the Illinois
statute permits a close corporation to provide in its articles of incorporation
"that the business of the corporation shall be managed by the shareholders
of the corporation rather than by a board of directors."1 24 Such a provision
may be inserted in the articles of incorporation by amendment if all of the
shareholders authorize it and may be deleted only on the approval of holders
of record of at least two-thirds of all the outstanding shares of each class of
the corporation. 125 Statutes similar to the Illinois Close Corporation Act have
29
28
27
been enacted in Delaware,126 Pennsylvania, 1 Kansas,1

and Arizona. 1

The integrated close corporation statute, like the unified statute discussed
above, constitutes a device far superior to the present state of the Missouri
law for assuring a minority shareholder long-term employment and status
within a close corporation. Because the shareholders would, in effect, run
the company, the public policy objections to employing shareholders for life
are invalid. Whether the Missouri legislature would adopt the Supplement,
an Illinois-type statute, or a combination of the two, an integrated close corporation statute would provide the minority shareholder with an excellent
tool for protecting his reasonable expectation of permanent participation in
management and employment with the company.
120.

1-d.

1211(a).

121. Id. 5 1211(c). The Delaware statute only requires that a majority of a close
corporation's outstanding voting stock join in such an agreement. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 350 (1975).
122. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 121 l(b) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).

123. Seel F. O'NEAL, supranote2, 5 1.14b (Cum. Supp. 1981).Asimilarprovision in the Supplement applies only to unanimous shareholder agreements. 37
Bus. LAW., supranote 1, at 290.
124. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 51212(a) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).

125.

Id. § 1212(b). The Delaware statute requires only a majority vote of the

shareholders to delete such provisions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1975).
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 341-356 (1975).
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 1371-1386 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
128. KAN. STAT. ANN. §5 17-7201 to -7216 (1981).
129. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-201 to -218 (1977).
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CONCLUSION

The assurance of long-term employment and status is primary among
an investor's concerns in deciding whether to purchase a minority interest
in a closely held corporation. Usually forsaking other employment, the
minority shareholder may reasonably expect that, because he is investing
a substantial portion of his savings in the enterprise, he should be able to
participate in the management of and be permanently employed by the company. Nevertheless, an agreement promising permanent employment or a
particular corporate office will not be specifically enforced under present
Missouri law.
Outside Missouri, a wealth of statutory and common law has developed
giving legal cognizance to the special needs of the shareholders of closely
held corporations. These cases and statutes recognize that long-term employment contracts are often necessary for the close corporation to obtain the
type of executive or investor it needs. Thus, they legalize agreements among
all of the shareholders, which agreements in the past have been considered
against public policy as improperly impinging on the discretion of future
boards of directors.
The need for legislative reform to protect the reasonable expectations
of persons who acquire an interest in a Missouri close corporation is manifest.
The challenge to the Missouri legislature is to join in the growing trend
among the states and respond to this need.
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